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1 Introduction
A number of authors have studied the sharing of a resource between several agents. The litera-
ture on bankruptcy problems is extensive, and includes works by O´Neill (1982), and Aumann
and Maschler (1985) among others. The reader is referred to Thomson (2003) and Moulin (2002)
as surveys of this literature.
Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002b) introduce PERT problems inspired by the Project Evalu-
ation Review Technique. The PERT is basically a method for analysing the tasks involved in
completing a given project - especially the time needed to complete each task - and for iden-
tifying the minimum time needed to complete the entire project, which is called PERT time.
PERT problems focus on projects that involve several activities which have to be completed in
a specific order. The resource, extra time, is initially divided among the different paths, i.e.
sets of consecutive activities from the beginning to the end of the project, each of which has a
positive slack or greater time that can be added to the path without delaying the project. Once
the various durations of the activities have been estimated, the coordinator of the project plans
the schedule, computing the PERT time and identifying the activities that can be allowed more
time if required. To distribute this extra time among the project activities, the coordinator
would initially assign the maximum time possible to each activity, but this assignment would
delay the project. So, how should this extra time be allocated between the different activities
with slacks? This problem has been studied also in Castro et al (2007).
Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002a) introduce a general class of problems, which includes both
bankruptcy and PERT problems, which are called problems with constraints and claims. These
authors study how the well-known concept of proportionality can be defined in this framework by
presenting two rules, both based on the proportionality principle: the proportional rule (weakly
Pareto optimal) and the extended proportional rule (Pareto optimal). In addition, they give a
characterisation of the latter rule.
The object of this paper is to study how the principle of equal award works in this kind of
problem. We study two single-valued rules based on this principle: the constrained equal award
rule, which satisfies weak Pareto optimality, and the extended constrained equal award rule,
which satisfies Pareto optimality.
Alternative rules represent different ways of applying different criteria to the resolution
of the problem; but which should we choose? One way to choose a rule is to identify the
desirable properties that each rule satisfies, so that choosing a rule means choosing a set of
these properties. Thus, we introduce desirable properties and check which are satisfied by the
proposed rules. Most of these properties are inspired by properties discussed in the literature of
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bankruptcy problems. However, the relations between properties in this general framework are
quite different. For instance, properties that were compatible in bankruptcy problems - such as
Pareto optimality and composition up - become incompatible in problems with constraints and
claims.
We characterise the extended constrained equal award rule as the only rule satisfying Pareto
optimality, equal treatment of equals, consistency, invariance under claims truncation, a lower
bound requirement over subsets and limited composition up.
The paper is organised thus: Section 2 introduces the problems with constraints and claims;
Section 3, which describes the different properties of the rules; and finally, Section 4, which
studies the rules based on the equal award principle and characterises the extended constrained
equal award rule.
2 Problems with constraints and claims
First we introduce some notation:
Let N = {1, 2, ...} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite set N ⊂ N, let n be the
cardinality of N . Given x = (xi)i∈N , y = (yi)i∈N ∈ RN , x ≥ y means xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N ;
x > y means xi > yi for all i ∈ N and x+ y = (xi + yi)i∈N . Given S ⊂ N , xS = (xi)i∈S ∈ RS
and x−i = xN\{i}.
We denote by P = {pi1, . . . , pip} a collection of subsets of N that covers N
( p⋃
i=1
pii = N
)
.
Note that P does not need to be a partition. Given M ⊂ N with M 6= ∅, we denote by PM the
collection of subsets induced by P in M , i.e. PM = {pi ∩M : pi ∈ P, pi ∩M 6= ∅}.
Given Y ⊂ RN , let PB(Y ) = {y ∈ Y : if x ∈ RN , x ≥ y and x 6= y then x /∈ Y } be the
Pareto boundary of Y , andWPB(Y ) = {y ∈ Y : if x ∈ RN , x > y then x /∈ Y } the weak Pareto
boundary.
As is the case with bankruptcy or taxation problems, a resource must be shared between
several agents who have claims on it. But now we assume that there are several subsets of agents
(P ) and that each subset (pi ∈ P ) can receive at most only a part of the resource available (which
will be denoted by Epi).
Definition 1 A problem with constraints and claims (briefly PCC) is a 4-tuple (N,P, c, E)
where N =
⋃
pi∈P
pi is the set of agents, P is a collection of subsets that covers N , 0 ≤ c ∈ RN
is the vector whose coordinates are the claims of the agents and E = (Epi)pi∈P ∈ Rp, where Epi
represents an upper bound of a part of the resource available for the subset pi. We will often
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write (c, E) instead of (N,P, c, E). We denote by G(N) the class of PCC with the set of agents
N , and by G the class of all PCC.
Definition 2 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), we define the set of feasible allocations of (c, E) by
F (c, E) =
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ≤ xi ≤ ci, for every i ∈ N∑
i∈pi
xi ≤ Epi, for every pi ∈ P
 .
A rule is a map R that associates with each problem (c, E) ∈ F (c, E) an allocation R(c, E) ∈
F (c, E), where each Ri(c, E) represents the award received by agent i.
We now present some examples of PCCs. We prove that bankruptcy problems and PERT
problems are PCCs. Finally, we give an example of a PCC that is neither a bankruptcy problem
nor a PERT problem.
A bankruptcy problem (O´Neill (1982)) is a triple, (N, c,E), where N denotes the set of
claimants, c is the vector of claims and E ≤ ∑
i∈N
ci is the resource available. Given a bankruptcy
problem (N, c,E), we can associate with it a PCC (N,P, c, E) where P = {N}.
We now introduce PERT problems following Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002b). Suppose that
we need to carry out a project in which several activities are involved, that must be completed in
a certain order. This situation is modelled by a directed graph where the arcs are the activities
and each node denotes the end or the beginning of one or more activities. Each activity i has a
duration di. A path is a set of consecutive arcs from the origin to the end. The duration of a
path pi is the sum of the durations of the activities along this path, i.e., d(pi) =
∑
i∈pi
di.
The PERT time is the duration of the longest path, d(PERT ) = max
pi
d(pi). The slack of
path pi is ps(pi) = d(PERT ) − d(pi) and the slack of activity i is as(i) = min
i∈pi
ps(pi). A path is
critical if its slack is 0. We want to finish the project as soon as possible, i.e., in the PERT time.
However, it is possible to assign extra time (at most ps(pi) in path pi) to some activities (at most
as(i) to activity i) without delaying the project. The problem is how to do that. Formally:
A PERT problem is a triple (G, (ps(pi))pi∈P , (as(i))i∈N ) where G is the graph describing the
relations between the activities, N denotes the set of activities, P the set of paths, ps(pi) the
slack of path pi, and as(i) the slack of activity i.
An example will clarify the model.
Example 1 The following project comprises four activities (A, B, C, and D) where activity A
must be completed before B and C can begin. However, there is no relation between activity D
and the other activities. A number is associated with each activity - or arc - which denotes its
duration.
4
 A (3)
 B (6)
C (5)
D (10)
The project has three paths: pi1 = {A,B}, pi2 = {A,C}, and pi3 = {D} . Thus, ps (pi1) =
10 − 9 = 1, ps (pi2) = 10 − 8 = 2, ps (pi3) = 10 − 10 = 0, as (A) = min {1, 2} = 1, as (B) = 1,
as (C) = 2, and as (D) = 0.
Given a PERT problem (G, (ps(pi))pi∈P , (as(i))i∈N ), we can associate a PCC (N,P, c, E),
where N is the set of activities, P is the set of paths, ci = as(i) for all i ∈ N , and Epi = ps(pi)
for all pi ∈ P . Note that ci is obtained from E by ci = min
i∈pi
Epi. Thus, PERT problems are also
a subset of PCC.
The PCC associated with the PERT problem in Example 1 is as follows: N = {A,B,C,D} ,
P = {pi1, pi2, pi3} , c = (1, 1, 2, 0) , and E = (1, 2, 0).
There are PCCs which are neither bankruptcy nor PERT problems. An example is described
below.
Example 2
The central government of a country has to divide a budget of 100 among eight local governments
in eight different regions. The local government claims are (8, 12, 20, 25, 30, 25, 15, 25).
In sharing this budget, the central government wants to take into account two particular
characteristics of the regions: the political party governing it and its wealth. These issues are
explained in more detail below.
• Political parties. There are three different political parties ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3. Assume that
party ρ1 controls central government and local governments g1, g2, g3, and g4. Party ρ2
controls local governments g5 and g6. Party ρ3 controls local governments g7 and g8.
Central government wishes to avoid discrimination against local governments in terms of
the political party in power. Hence, for each party ρi, i = 1, 2, 3, the central government
wants to ensure that the average received by the local governments controlled by this party
should not be greater than 18.
• Wealth. Assume that regions 5 and 7 are wealthy whereas the rest are poor. In order to
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help poor regions improve their status, central government wants to ensure that the wealthy
regions receive no more than 20.
For each i = 1, ..., 8 let xi denote the amount received by the local government of region i.
Central government wants to select x = (xi)
8
i=1 satisfying the following conditions:
8∑
i=1
xi ≤ 100,
4∑
i=1
xi ≤ 72, x5 + x6 ≤ 36, x7 + x8 ≤ 36, and x5 + x7 ≤ 20.
Thus, this problem can be modelled as a PCC where
N = {i}8.i=1 ,
P = {pii}5i=1 with pi1 = N,pi2 = {1, 2, 3, 4} , pi3 = {5, 6} , pi4 = {7, 8} , pi5 = {5, 7} ;
c = (8, 12, 20, 25, 30, 25, 15, 25) and
E = (100, 72, 36, 36, 20) .
3 Properties of the rules
In this section we define some desirable properties of the rules. Most are well-known properties
of the rules associated with bankruptcy problems adapted to this general framework. We first
give an explanation of the property and then state it formally. Consider an allocation rule R.
There are two well-known optimality properties. Pareto optimality (PO): for all (c, E) ∈
G(N) we have that the award vector R(c, E) ∈ PB(F (c, E)), and weak Pareto optimality
(WPO): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N) we have that R(c, E) ∈WPB(F (c, E)).
It is natural to require that agents with equal claims, who must satisfy the same constraints,
receive equal award. This property is called equal treatment of equals (ETE): for all (c, E) ∈
G(N), given i, j ∈ N such that ci = cj and i ∈ pi ⇔ j ∈ pi, then Ri(c, E) = Rj(c, E).
A PCC (c, E) can be interpreted as solving many subproblems as subsets in P , and it would
be desirable for an agent not to receive less than the minimum amount he is awarded in every
subproblem in which he is involved. This is stated by the property lower bound requirement
over subsets (LS): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N) and every i ∈ N , we have Ri(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
Ri (cpi, Epi).
LS has been introduced in Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002a).
The idea of composition up is that dividing the estate between agents is the same as first
dividing one part of the estate in accordance with the initial claims of the agents and later
dividing the remainder with respect to the outstanding claims. Composition up was initially
analysed in bargaining theory by Kalai (1977) and was called ”step by step negotiation”. Young
(1988) introduced this property in the context of taxation. Composition up is a property widely
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used in bankruptcy problems. We can mention, for instance, the papers of Dagan (1996) and
Moulin (2000).
Composition up (CU): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N) and all E′ ∈ Rp such that 0 ≤ E′ ≤ E we have
that R(c, E) = R(c, E′) +R(c−R(c, E′), E′′), where E′′pi = Epi −
∑
i∈pi
Ri(c, E′) for all pi ∈ P . We
will denote the composition up property restricted to problems with p = 1, i.e., P = {N}, as
limited composition up (LCU).
The next property states that if part of a claim is above the minimum amount to be divided,
in accordance with E, this part should be ignored and the rule should not consider it. This
property appears, for instance, in Curiel et al (1987), Dagan and Volij (1993) and Dagan (1996).
Invariance under claims truncation (ICT): for all (c, E) ∈ G(N), R(c, E) = R(cE , E) where
cEi = min
{
ci, min
i∈pi∈P
Epi
}
.
Consistency says that if some agents leave with their awards and the PCC is reevaluated
from the point of view of the remaining agents, then the rule should allocate the same awards
to these agents as those obtained in the initial problem. This property appears, for instance, in
Aumann and Maschler (1985) and Young (1987).
Consistency (CONS): for all (N,P, c, E) ∈ G(N), givenM ⊂ N ,M 6= ∅, and (M,PM , cM , E∗M ) ∈
G(M) where E∗pi∩M = Epi−
∑
i∈pi∩(N\M)
Ri(N,P, c, E) for each pi∩M ∈ PM , then, Ri(M,PM , cM , E∗M ) =
Ri(N,P, c, E) for all i ∈M .
Note that all the properties defined above are well-known in the literature of bankruptcy
except the lower bound requirement over subsets (LS ).
Remark 1 Although the definitions of most of these properties in PCC are straightforward
generalisations of bankruptcy problem properties, the relations among these properties are com-
pletely different in PCC. Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002a), for instance, proved that Pareto
optimality is incompatible with composition up.
4 The equal award principle in PCC
In this section, we present two single-valued rules based on the equal award principle. This
principle assigns equal amounts to all agents subject to the constraints of the problem. The
constrained equal award rule for PCC is defined also the same as in bankruptcy problems.
The extended constrained equal award rule applies the equal award principle repeatedly until
no payoff can be increased. Both rules coincide with the constrained equal award rule when
restricted to bankruptcy problems.
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The constrained equal award rule (hereafter abbreviated as CEA) awards the same amount
to all claimants subject to no one receiving more than his claim:
CEAi(c, E) = min{λ, ci}
where λ = max
{
λ′ : (min{λ′, ci})i∈N ∈ F (c, E)
}
. It can be easily proved that when c /∈ F (c, E)
we have λ = min
pi∈P
{λpi}, where λpi is the maximum feasible award in the subproblem (cpi, Epi).
This rule was defined in Sa´nchez (1999), who proved that CEA satisfies WPO and that
there always exists a part of the available resource which is completely allocated between its
claimants, i.e., there exists pi0 ∈ P such that
∑
i∈pi0
CEAi(c, E) = Epi0 . CEA also satisfies ETE
and CU. Unfortunately, it fails to satisfy ICT, CONS and PO and so we will extend the rule
such that it satisfies PO, merely by applying it repeatedly until no agent can improve his award.
Before defining the extended rule formally, we apply this process to an example. Consider
(N,P, c, E) ∈ G(N) where N = {1, 2, 3}, P = {pi1, pi2} with pi1 = {1, 2} and pi2 = {2, 3},
c = (1, 5, 2), and E = (2, 4). The CEA awards (1, 1, 1). Note that:
• Agents 1 and 2 cannot be awarded more, because for every ε > 0, (1 + ε, 1, 1) /∈ F (c, E)
and (1, 1 + ε, 1) /∈ F (c, E). In both cases x1 + x2 = 2 + ε > Epi1 = 2.
• However, agent 3 can increase his award, i.e., there exists ε > 0 such that (1, 1, 1 + ε) ∈
F (c, E).
Consider the following problem (N2, P 2, c2, E2), obtained when agents 1 and 2 leave with
their awards because their payoff cannot be increased. Thus, N2 = {3}, P 2 = PN2 = {{3}},
c2 = c23 −CEA3(c, E) = 2− 1 = 1 and E2 = E{3} = E{2,3} −
∑
i=2,3
CEAi(c, E) = 4− 1− 1 = 2.
Finally, we compute CEA(c2, E2) = c23 = 1.
In the end, agent 1 obtains 1, agent 2 obtains 1, agent 3 obtains 1 + 1 = 2, and (1, 1, 2) is a
Pareto optimal feasible allocation in the problem (c, E).
We now formally define the process applied above:
• (N1, P 1, c1, E1) = (N,P, c, E). For any agent i ∈ N we compute CEAi(c1, E1) =
min{λ1, c1i }. Assume that we have already calculated (Ns, P s, cs, Es) and CEA(cs, Es)
for any s ≤ t.
• Let (N t+1, P t+1, ct+1, Et+1) be defined by:
– N t+1 =
i ∈ N t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ ε > 0 such that(CEA−i(ct, Et), CEAi(ct, Et) + ε) ∈ F (ct, Et)
.
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– P t+1 = P tNt+1 .
– ct+1 = (cti − CEAi(ct, Et))i∈Nt+1 .
– Et+1pit+1 = E
t
pit −
∑
i∈pit
CEAi(ct, Et) for any pit+1 = pit ∩N t+1 ∈ P t+1 with pit ∈ P t and
pit ∩N t+1 6= ∅.
For any i ∈ N t+1 we compute CEAi(ct+1, Et+1) = min{λt+1, ct+1i }.
This process ends when there exists a stage T such that NT 6= ∅ and NT+1 = ∅. Since CEA
satisfies WPO we have N t+1  N t for any t < T . Hence, the process described above ends in
a finite number of steps.
For every agent i ∈ N there exists a stage Ti such that i ∈ NTi but i /∈ NTi+1.
Definition 3 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N) and i ∈ N , we define the extended constrained equal award
rule, ECEA, for agent i as:
ECEAi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
CEAi(ct, Et).
ECEA satisfies PO, but it is possible that for some pi ∈ P part of the resource available is
not completely allocated, i.e.,
∑
i∈pi
ECEAi(c, E) < Epi.
We obtain ECEA(c, E) = (0.5, 0.5, 1.5, 0) for Example 1 and ECEA(c, E) = (8, 12, 15, 15, 10, 15, 10, 15)
for Example 2.
Proposition 1 Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), we have:
1. ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
Ti∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
2. pt+1 < pt for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
3. Given i ∈ N with ECEAi(c, E) < ci, there exists pi ∈ P satisfying i ∈ pi, pi ∩ NTi 6= ∅,
pi ∩NTi+1 = ∅ and ∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) = Epi.
Proof.
1. Given i ∈ N , when t < Ti, min{λt, cti} = λt. Otherwise, min{λt, cti} = cti and Ti = t,
which is a contradiction. Thus, the award obtained by an agent i can be expressed as the
sum of the awards obtained before reaching stage Ti (λt when t < Ti ) and the amount he
is awarded at stage Ti (min{λTi , cTii }), i.e.,
ECEAi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
min{λt, ci} =
Ti−1∑
t=0
λt +min
{
λTi , ci −
Ti−1∑
t=0
λt
}
= min
{
Ti∑
t=0
λt, ci
}
where we assume, for the sake of convenience, that λ0 = 0.
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2. It is enough to prove that for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1 there exists a subset pi ∈ P such that
pi ∩N t 6= ∅ and pi ∩N t+1 = ∅.
Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} . By the definition of CEA, there exists pi ∈ P such that pit =
pi ∩N t ∈ P t, pit 6= ∅, and ∑
i∈pit
CEAi(ct, Et) = Epit . Thus, for all i ∈ pit,
(
CEA−i(ct, Et), CEAi(ct, Et) + ε
)
/∈ F (ct, Et),
which means that pi ∩N t+1 = pit ∩N t+1 = ∅.
3. Given i ∈ N with ECEAi(c, E) < ci, assume that for every pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi,
pi ∩ NTi 6= ∅, and pi ∩ NTi+1 = ∅ we have that ∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) < Epi. Let ε > 0 be
defined in such a way that:
• ε < Epi −
∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) for every pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩ NTi 6= ∅, and
pi ∩NTi+1 = ∅.
• ε < ci − ECEAi(c, E).
in view of the definition of ε,
(
CEA−i
(
cTi , ETi
)
, CEAi
(
cTi , ETi
)
+ ε
) ∈ F (cTi , ETi),
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 2 ECEA satisfies PO, LCU, ETE, LS, CONS and ICT.
Proof. It is clear that ECEA satisfies PO. ECEA also satisfies LCU because ECEA restricted
to bankruptcy problems coincides with CEA, which satisfies CU. It is easy to prove that ECEA
satisfies ETE.
• ECEA satisfies LS. Given an agent i ∈ N , we need to prove that
ECEAi(c, E) ≥ min
i∈α∈P
ECEAi(cα, Eα).
By Proposition 1.1, ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
Ti∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
If
Ti∑
t=1
λt ≥ ci, LS holds trivially because ECEAi(c, E) = ci.
If
Ti∑
t=1
λt < ci, ECEAi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
λt < ci. By Proposition 1.3, there exists pi ∈ P where
i ∈ pi, pi ∩NTi 6= ∅, pi ∩NTi+1 = ∅ and
Epi =
∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi
min

Tj∑
t=1
λt, cj
 .
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It is enough to prove that CEAi(cpi, Epi) ≤ ECEAi(c, E) because ECEAi(cpi, Epi) =
CEAi(cpi, Epi).
Since
Ti∑
t=1
λt < ci, cpi /∈ F (cpi, Epi). Thus, CEAj(cpi, Epi) = min{λpi, cj} for all j ∈ pi and
Epi =
∑
j∈pi
min{λpi, cj}. (1)
By definition of ECEA, Tj ≤ Ti for all j ∈ pi. Thus,
Tj∑
t=1
λt ≤
Ti∑
t=1
λt for all j ∈ pi. By (1)
and (2), λpi ≤
Ti∑
t=1
λt. Hence,
ECEAi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
λt ≥ λpi ≥ min{λpi, ci} = CEAi(cpi, Epi).
• ECEA satisfies CONS. Given (N,P, c, E) ∈ G(N) and M ⊂ N with M 6= ∅, we must
prove that
ECEAi(N,P, c, E) = ECEAi(M,PM , cM , E∗M ) for every i ∈M
where E∗pi∩M = Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECEAj(c, E) for every pi ∩M ∈ PM .
We restrict the proof to the case when c /∈ F (c, E). Otherwise, it is easy to prove that
cM ∈ F (cM , E∗M ) and CONS holds trivially.
We introduce some definitions:
– Given i ∈M , we define TMi in the usual way, i ∈MT
M
i but i /∈MTMi +1.
– Tt(M) = {i ∈M : Ti = t}.
– L(Tt(M)) = {i ∈ Tt(M) : ECEAi(c, E) < ci}.
– {kr}sr=1. We take k0 = 0. Assume that we have defined kl for all l ≤ r−1 and kr−1 <
max
i∈M
{Ti} . Thus, kr = min{t > kr−1 : L(Tt(M)) 6= ∅} if {t > kr−1 : L(Tt(M)) 6= ∅} 6=
∅. Otherwise, kr = max
i∈M
{Ti}, r = s and the process ends.
Note that by definition of kr, for any agent i ∈ M such that Ti ∈ (kr−1, kr),
ECEAi(c, E) = ci.
We prove that given i ∈M with Ti ∈ (kr−1, kr] we have TMi = r and ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) =
ECEAi(c, E). We prove it by induction in r.
We first prove the following claim.
Claim 1 Given i ∈M with Ti ∈ (kr−1, kr], ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
kr∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
11
Proof. By Proposition 1.1, we have ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
Ti∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
. We distinguish two
cases:
1. Ti = kr. It is trivial to see that ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
kr∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
2. Ti ∈ (kr−1, kr). By definition of kr, ECEAi(c, E) = ci. Since Ti < kr we have
min
{
kr∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
= ci.
Consider r = 1. Assume that CEAj(cM , E∗M ) = min{λ1M , cj} for all j ∈ M . The case
r = 1 is a consequence of the following claims.
Claim 2 λ1M =
k1∑
t=1
λt.
Proof. We prove that λ1M ≥
k1∑
t=1
λt and λ1M ≤
k1∑
t=1
λt.
1. λ1M ≥
k1∑
t=1
λt. It is enough to prove that
∑
j∈α∩M
min
{ k1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
≤ E∗α∩M for all α ∩M ∈ PM .
Let j ∈ α ∩M be such that Tj ≤ k1. By Claim 1, ECEAj(c, E) = min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
.
Let j ∈ α∩M be such that Tj > k1. By Proposition 1.1, ECEAj(c, E) = min
{
Tj∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
≥
min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
. Therefore
∑
j∈α∩M
min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
≤
∑
j∈α∩M
ECEAj(c, E) ≤ E∗α∩M .
2. λ1M ≤
k1∑
t=1
λt. Let i ∈ L(Tk1(M)) be such that ECEAi(c, E) < ci. Thus, Ti = k1.
By Proposition 1.3, there exists pi ∈ P with i ∈ pi, pi ∩Nk1 6= ∅, pi ∩Nk1+1 = ∅ and∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) = Epi. Moreover, Tj ≤ k1 for every j ∈ pi ∩M . By Claim 1,
∑
j∈pi∩M
min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECEAj(c, E) = E∗pi∩M
Since
∑
j∈pi∩M
min{λ1M , cj} ≤ E∗pi∩M , λ1M ≤
k1∑
t=1
λt.
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Claim 3 If i ∈M and Ti ≤ k1 we have TMi = 1 and ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = ECEAi(c, E).
Proof. Let i ∈ M be such that Ti ≤ k1. By Claim 1 ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
By Claim 2 CEAi(cM , E∗M ) = ECEAi(c, E). We consider two cases:
1. ECEAi(c, E) = ci. Therefore ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = CEAi(cM , E
∗
M ) = ci and hence
TMi = 1.
2. ECEAi(c, E) < ci. By definition of kr, we have Ti = k1. By Proposition 1.3 there
exists pi ∈ P with i ∈ pi, pi ∩ Nk1 6= ∅, pi ∩ Nk1+1 = ∅ and ∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) = Epi.
Thus,
∑
j∈pi∩M
CEAj(cM , E∗M ) =
∑
j∈pi∩M
min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECEAj(c, E) = E∗pi∩M ,
and hence TMi = 1 and ECEAi(cM , E
∗
M ) = CEAi(cM , E
∗
M ) = min
{
k1∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
Assume the result holds for every r ≤ l.
Take r = l + 1 and the problem (M l+1, P l+1M , c
l+1
M , (E
∗
M )
l+1) where:
– M l+1 =M ∩Nkl+1 .
– P l+1M = (PM )M l+1 .
– cl+1i = ci −
kl∑
t=1
λt for all i ∈M l+1.
– El+1
pi∩M l+1 = E
∗
pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩(M\M l+1)
ECEAi(cM , EM )−
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
kl∑
t=1
λt
= E∗pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩(M\M l+1)
ECEAi(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
kl∑
t=1
λt
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M l+1)
ECEAi(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
kl∑
t=1
λt.
by induction hypothesis.
Consider CEAi(cl+1M , (E
∗
M )
l+1) = min
{
λl+1M , c
l+1
i
}
.
Claim 4 λl+1M =
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt.
Proof. We prove that λl+1M ≥
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt and λl+1M ≤
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt.
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1. λl+1M ≥
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt. It is enough to prove that
∑
j∈α∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt, cl+1j
 ≤ El+1α∩M l+1 for all α ∩M l+1 ∈ P l+1M .
Taking into account the definitions of cl+1M and (E
∗
M )
l+1 above, the inequality above
is equivalent to the following inequality
∑
j∈α∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
 ≤ Epi − ∑
j∈pi∩(N\M l+1)
ECEAi(c, E),
which we prove below.
Given j ∈ α ∩ M l+1 such that Tj > kl+1, by Proposition 1.1, ECEAj(c, E) =
min
{
Tj∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
≥ min
{
kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
. Given j ∈ α ∩M l+1 such that kl < Tj ≤ kl+1,
by Claim 1, ECEAj(c, E) = min
{
kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
. Therefore,
∑
j∈α∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
 ≤ ∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
ECEAj(c, E)
≤ Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M l+1)
ECEAi(c, E)
2. λl+1M ≤
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt. Consider i ∈ L(Tkl+1(M)) with ECEAi(c, E) < ci. By Propo-
sition 1.3, there exists pi ∈ P with i ∈ pi, pi ∩ Nkl+1 6= ∅, pi ∩ Nkl+1+1 = ∅ and∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) = Epi. By Claim 1, since for every j ∈ pi ∩M l+1, kl < Tj ≤ kl+1,
we have ECEAj(c, E) = min
{
kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
}
. Hence
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
 = ∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
ECEAj(c, E)
= Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M l+1)
ECEAi(c, E),
which implies that
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt, cl+1j
 = El+1pi∩M l+1 .
Since
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
min{λl+1M , cl+1i } ≤ El+1pi∩M l+1 , λl+1M ≤
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt.
14
Claim 5 If i ∈ M and kl < Ti ≤ kl+1 we have TMi = l + 1 and ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) =
ECEAi(c, E).
Proof. Let i ∈ N be such that kl < Ti ≤ kl+1. By Claim 1, ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
kl+1∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
.
By Claim 4, CEAi(cl+1M , (E
∗
M )
l+1)) = min
{
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt, cl+1i
}
. We distinguish two cases:
1. ECEAi(c, E) = ci. By the induction hypothesis and Proposition 1.1, the award ob-
tained by agent i up to stage kl+1 in the reduced problem is
kl+1∑
t=1
CEAi(ctM , (E
∗
M )
t)) =
kl∑
t=1
λt + min
{
kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt, cl+1i
}
= min
{
kl+1∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
= ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = ci. Hence
TMi = l + 1.
2. ECEAi(c, E) < ci. By definition of kr, we have Ti = kl+1. By Proposition 1.3 there
exists pi ∈ P such that i ∈ pi, pi∩Nkl+1 6= ∅, pi∩Nkl+1+1 = ∅ and ∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) =
Epi. We have:
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
CEAi(cl+1M , E
l+1
M ) =
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=kl+1
λt, cl+1j

=
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
min

kl+1∑
t=1
λt, cj
− ∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
kl∑
t=1
λt
=
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
ECEAj(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩M l+1
kl∑
t=1
λt
= El+1
pi∩(N\M l+1).
Thus, ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = min
{
kl+1∑
t=1
λt, ci
}
and TMi = l + 1.
• ECEA satisfies ICT. Given (c, E) ∈ G(N) and (cE , E), where cEi = min
{
ci, min
i∈pi∈P
Epi
}
for all i ∈ N we must prove that ECEA(c, E) = ECEA(cE , E). We restrict the proof to
the case of c /∈ F (c, E). Otherwise, cE = c and ICT holds trivially.
Firstly we prove the following claims:
Claim 6 Consider (N,P, c, E), (N,P, c′, E) ∈ G(N) where cEi ≤ c′i ≤ ci for all i ∈ N. We
define T ′i in the problem (N,P, c
′, E) in the usual way (i ∈ NT ′i but i /∈ NT ′i+1). Hence,
given i ∈ N such that Ti = 1, we have T ′i = 1 and ECEAi(c, E) = ECEAi(c′, E).
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Proof. We know that if Ti = 1, ECEAi(c, E) = min{λ1, ci}.
Let λ′ be such that CEAj(c′, E) = min{λ′, c′j} for all j ∈ N .
Since ECEA satisfies PO, for all j ∈ N, ECEAj(c, E) ≤ cEj ≤ c′j ≤ cj . Thus, for all
j ∈ N, min{λ1, cj} = min{λ1, c′j}. Hence, for all α ∈ P∑
j∈α
min{λ1, cj} =
∑
j∈α
min{λ1, c′j} ≤ Eα,
which means that λ1 ≤ λ′.
We distinguish two cases:
1. ECEAi(c, E) = ci. Thus, ci ≤ λ1. Since ECEAi(c, E) ≤ cEi , cEi = c′i = ci. As
λ1 ≤ λ′ we have CEAi(c′, E) = ci. Thus, ECEAi(c′, E) = ci and T ′i = 1.
2. ECEAi(c, E) < ci. Thus, ECEAi(c, E) = λ1. By Proposition 1.3, there exists pi ∈ P
such that i ∈ pi, pi ∩N1 6= ∅, pi ∩N2 = ∅ and
Epi =
∑
j∈pi
ECEAj(c, E) =
∑
j∈pi
min{λ1, cj} =
∑
j∈pi
min{λ1, c′j}.
As
∑
j∈pi
min{λ′, c′j} ≤ Epi, λ1 ≥ λ′. Hence, λ1 = λ′, T ′i = 1 and
ECEAi(c, E) = min{λ1, ci} = min{λ1, c′i} = min{λ′, c′i}
= CEAi(c′, E) = ECEAi(c′, E).
Claim 7 Consider (N,P, c, E) ∈ G(N) and (M,PM , cM , E∗M ) ∈ G(M) with M = N t.
Given i ∈M with Ti = t we have TMi = 1.
Proof. Consider i ∈ M with Ti = t. We know by CONS that ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) =
ECEAi(c, E) = min
{
t∑
s=1
λs, ci
}
. Consider CEAi(cM , E∗M ) = min{λ1M , ci}. We prove
that λ1M =
t∑
s=1
λs.
CEAi(cM , E∗M ) ≤ ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = min
{
t∑
s=1
λs, ci
}
. Hence λ1M ≤
t∑
s=1
λs.
Since M = N t, for all pi ∩M ∈ PM
∑
j∈pi∩M
min
{
t∑
s=1
λs, ci
}
≤
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECEAi(c, E)
=
∑
j∈pi∩M
ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) ≤ E∗pi∩M .
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Therefore λ1M ≥
t∑
s=1
λs.
Now we prove that ECEA satisfies ICT by induction in t.
By Claim 6 we have ECEAi(c, E) = ECEAi(cE , E) for all i ∈ N such that Ti = 1. We
assume ECEAi(c, E) = ECEAi(cE , E) for all i ∈ N such that Ti < t. Given i ∈ N with
Ti = t, consider M = N t and the problems (M,PM , cM , E∗M ) and (M,PM , c
E
M , (E
∗
M )
E)
associated with (N,P, c, E) and
(
N,P, cE , E
)
, respectively. Note that under the induction
hypothesis (E∗M )
E =
(
Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
ECEAi(cE , E)
)
pi∩M∈PM
= E∗M .
By Claim 7 we know that TMi = 1. Since c
E∗
j ≤ cEj ≤ cj for all j ∈ M , by Claim 6 we
have ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = ECEAi(c
E
M , E
∗
M ). Since ECEA satisfies CONS we have:
ECEAi(c, E) = ECEAi(cM , E∗M ) = ECEAi(c
E
M , E
∗
M ) = ECEAi(c
E , E).
Theorem 1 The extended constrained equal award rule is the only rule satisfying PO, ETE,
LS, LCU, ICT, and CONS.
Proof. By Proposition 2, we know that ECEA satisfies PO, ETE, LS, LCU, ICT, and CONS.
Thus, to prove uniqueness, let us assume that there exists an allocation rule R satisfying PO,
ETE, LS, LCU, ICT, and CONS.
When c ∈ F (c, E) by PO, Ri(c, E) = ci = ECEAi(c, E). So we study the case where
c /∈ F (c, E). We prove uniqueness by induction on p.
• Consider p = 1, i.e. P = {N}. In this case, ECEA(c, E) = CEA(c, E).
We know, from Dagan (1996), that the constrained equal award rule is the only efficient
rule satisfying ETE, CU, and ICT. Since R satisfies PO, ETE, LCU, and ICT, R(c, E) =
CEA(c, E) = ECEA(c, E).
• Assume R(c, E) = ECEA(c, E) when p ≤ k − 1.
• Consider p = k. By LS, Ri(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
Ri(cpi, Epi). By the induction hypothesis,
Ri(cpi, Epi) = ECEAi(cpi, Epi) for all pi ∈ P . Since ECEAi(cpi, Epi) = CEAi(cpi, Epi) for
all pi ∈ P ,
Ri(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
CEAi(cpi, Epi) = min
i∈pi∈P
{λpi, ci}.
Since CEAi(c, E) = min{λ1, ci} where λ1 = min
pi∈P
{λpi} we have R(c, E) ≥ CEA(c, E).
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When T = 1, ECEA(c, E) = CEA(c, E) ≤ R(c, E). However, both rules satisfy PO and
therefore, R(c, E) = ECEA(c, E). So we consider T > 1. In this case, there exists pi0 ∈ P
such that ∑
i∈pi0
CEAi(c, E) =
∑
i∈pi0
min{λ1, ci} = Epi0 .
Hence pi0 ⊂ N1 \N2 and CEAi(c, E) = ECEAi(c, E) for every i ∈ pi0.
Since R(c, E) ≥ CEA(c, E) and since both rules satisfy PO, we have CEAi(c, E) =
ECEAi(c, E) = Ri(c, E) for all i ∈ pi0.
Consider M = N \ pi0 and the following problem (M,PM , cM , E∗M ). Since |PM | = k − 1,
by the induction hypothesis, Ri(cM , EM ) = ECEAi(cM , EM ) for every i ∈M . Both rules
satisfy CONS, therefore Ri(c, E) = ECEAi(c, E) for each i ∈ M . We have just proved
that Ri(c, E) = ECEAi(c, E) for each i ∈ pi0. Thus, R(c, E) = ECEA(c, E).
The following table summarises the results about CEA, ECEA (the stars mark the prop-
erties that characterise ECEA), and some of the rules used to show the independence of the
axioms.
Properties CEA ECEA EPRO Pri R1 R2
Weak Pareto optimality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pareto optimality No Yes (?) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Equal treatment of equals Yes Yes (?) Yes No Yes Yes
Lower bound requirement over subsets No Yes (?) Yes Yes Yes No
Composition up Yes No No No No No
Limited composition up Yes Yes (?) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Invariance under claims truncation No Yes (?) No Yes Yes Yes
Consistency No Yes (?) Yes Yes No Yes
The paper ends by proving that all the properties used in Theorem 1 with the exception of
LCU are independent. We do not know what happens with this property.
• Let us consider Ri(c, E) = 0 for every (c, E) ∈ G(N) and every i ∈ N . It is easy to see
that this rule satisfies ETE, LS, LCU, ICT, and CONS, but it does not satisfy PO.
• We now define the extended proportional rule (EPRO) introduced in Bergantin˜os and
Sa´nchez (2002a).
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Given a PCC (N,P, c, E), the proportional rule PRO is defined by PRO(c, E) = λc, where
λ = max{λ′ : λ′c ∈ F (c, E)}.
In order to define EPRO, we apply the proportional principle repeatedly until no agent
can increase his award. We now present the process formally.
– (N1, P 1, c1, E1) = (N,P, c, E). For any agent i ∈ N we compute PROi(c1, E1) =
λ1c1. Assume that we have already calculated (Ns, P s, cs, Es) and PRO(cs, Es) for
any s ≤ t.
– Let (N t+1, P t+1, ct+1, Et+1) be defined by:
∗ N t+1 =
i ∈ N t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ ε > 0 such that(PRO−i(ct, Et), PROi(ct, Et) + ε) ∈ F (ct, Et)
.
∗ P t+1 = P tNt+1 .
∗ ct+1 = (cti − PROi(ct, Et))i∈Nt+1 .
∗ Et+1pit+1 = Etpit −
∑
i∈pit
PROi(ct, Et) for any pit+1 = pit ∩N t+1 ∈ P t+1 with pit ∈ P t
and pit ∩N t+1 6= ∅.
For any i ∈ N t+1 we compute PROi(ct+1, Et+1) = λt+1ct+1i .
This process ends when there exists a stage T such that NT 6= ∅ and NT+1 = ∅. Since
PRO satisfies WPO we have N t+1  N t for any t < T . Hence, the process described
above ends in a finite number of steps.
For every agent i ∈ N there exists a stage Ti such that i ∈ NTi but i /∈ NTi+1.
Given (c, E) ∈ G(N) and i ∈ N , we define EPRO for agent i as:
EPROi(c, E) =
Ti∑
t=1
PROi(ct, Et).
Bergantin˜os and Sa´nchez (2002a) prove that EPRO satisifies PO, ETE, LS, and CONS.
EPRO satisfies LCU . When P = {N}, EPRO coincides with the proportional rule in
bankruptcy problems. Since the proportional rule satisfies CU in bankruptcy problems,
EPRO satisfies LCU .
EPRO fails ICT. Consider N = {1, 2}, P = {N}, c = (6, 12), and E = 6. Thus,
R(c, E) = (2, 4), cE = (6, 6), and R(cE , E) = (3, 3) 6= R(c, E).
• Let us define a priority rule Pri(c, E), where agents receive their award according to the
order 1, 2, . . . , n, . . . . Let (c, E) ∈ G(N).
We define Pri1(c, E) = min
1∈pi∈P
{c1, Epi}.
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Assume that we have defined Prij(c, E) for all j ∈ N , j < i. We define
Prii(c, E) = min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Prij(c, E)
}
.
Note that this definition is equivalent to saying that
Prii(c, E) = max
 xi :
(
(Prij(c, E))j<i , xi, (yj)j>i
)
∈ F (c, E)
for some (yj)j>i with yj ≥ 0 for all j > i
 .
This alternative definition will be used later.
It is easy to see that Pri satisfies PO.
Pri satisfies LCU. When P = {N}, Pri is a priority rule. Moulin (2000) proves that this
kind of rule satisfies CU. Thus, Pri satisfies LCU.
Pri satisfies LS. Let i ∈ N . Since Prij(c, E) ≤ cj for all j ∈ N and
∑
j∈pi
Prij(c, E) ≤ Epi
for all pi ∈ P , we have that
Prii(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci,max
{
Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
cj , 0
}}
It is easy to see that if P = {N}, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Prij(c, E) = max
{
Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
cj , 0
}
.
Thus, Prii(c, E) ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
Prii(cpi, Epi).
Pri satisfies ICT. Consider agent 1.
Pri1(c, E) = min
1∈pi∈P
{c1, Epi} = cE1 = min
1∈pi∈P
{cE1 , Epi} = Pri1(cE , E).
Let us assume Prij(c, E) = Prij(cE , E) for all j ∈ N such that j < i. Consider agent i.
Since ci ≥ cEi = min
i∈pi∈P
{ci, Epi} ≥ min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Prij(cE , E)
}
, we have that
Prii(c, E) = min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Prij(c, E)
}
= min
i∈pi∈P
{
ci, Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Prij(cE , E)
}
= min
i∈pi∈P
{
cEi , Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i
Prij(cE , E)
}
= Prii(cE , E).
Thus, Pri(c, E) = Pri(cE , E).
Pri satisfies CONS. Given M ⊂ N , M 6= ∅ and (M,PM , cM , E∗M ), defined in the usual
way, we have to prove that Prii(c, E) = Prii(cM , E∗M ) for all i ∈M .
Consider M = {i1, . . . , im}, where i1 < i2 < . . . < im. Given agent i1,
Prii1(c, E) = min
i1∈pi∈P
{
ci1 , Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<i1
Prij(c, E)
}
= min
i1∈pi∩M∈PM
{
ci1 , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M):j<i1
Prij(c, E)
}
≥ min
i1∈pi∩M∈PM
{
ci1 , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E)
}
.
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If min
i1∈pi∩M∈PM
{
ci1 , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E)
}
= ci1 , then Prii1(c, E) = ci1 .
Assume that min
i1∈pi∩M∈PM
{
ci1 , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E)
}
= Epi′ −
∑
j∈pi′∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E)
for some pi′ ∈ P . Since ∑
j∈pi
Prij(c, E) ≤ Epi for all pi ∈ P , we have that Epi′ −∑
j∈pi′∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E) ≥ Prii1(c, E). Thus,
Prii1(c, E) ≥ Epi′ −
∑
j∈pi′∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E) ≥ Prii1(c, E).
Now,
Prii1(c, E) = min
i1∈pi∩M∈PM
{
ci1 , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E)
}
= min
i1∈pi∩M∈PM
{
ci1 , E
∗
pi∩M
}
= Prii1(cM , E
∗
M ).
Assume Priip(c, E) = Priip(cM , E
∗
M ) for all p < k. Now consider agent ik.
Priik(c, E) = min
ik∈pi∈P
{
cik , Epi −
∑
j∈pi:j<ik
Prij(c, E)
}
= min
ik∈pi∩M∈PM
{
cik , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M):j<ik
Prij(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩M :j<ik
Prij(c, E)
}
.
Using arguments similar to those used above with Prii1(c, E) we can prove that
Priik(c, E) = min
ik∈pi∩M∈PM
{
cik , Epi −
∑
j∈pi∩(N\M)
Prij(c, E)−
∑
j∈pi∩M :j<ik
Prij(cM , E∗M )
}
= min
ik∈pi∩M∈PM
{
cik , E
∗
pi∩M −
∑
j∈pi∩M :j<ik
Prij(cM , E∗M )
}
= Priik(cM , E
∗
M ).
P ri does not satisfy ETE. Consider N = {1, 2}, P = {N}, c = (2, 2), and E = 3. Then
Pri(c, E) = (2, 1).
• Let R1 be defined by R1i (c, E) = min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEα , Eα) + EPROi(c
′, E′) where
c′i = c
E
i − min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEα , Eα)
E′pi = Epi −
∑
i∈pi
min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEα , Eα).
It is easy to see that R1 satisfies PO and ICT by definition.
When P = {N}, R1 coincides with CEA, which satisfies CU. Thus, R1 satisfies LCU.
Since both CEA and EPRO satisfy ETE, R1 also satisfies ETE.
Next we prove that R1 satisfies LS, i.e., given i ∈ N , R1i (c, E) ≥ min
i∈α∈P
R1i (cα, Eα).
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By definition of R1,
min
i∈α∈P
R1i (cα, Eα) = min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEαα , Eα).
Since CEA satisfies ICT in bankruptcy problems,
min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEαα , Eα) = min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cα, Eα).
By definition of R1, we know that
R1i (c, E) ≥ min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEα , Eα).
In order to show that R1 satisfies LS, we prove that
min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEα , Eα) ≥ min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cα, Eα).
Assume that min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cEα , Eα) = CEAi(c
E
pi , Epi) = min{λEpi , cEi } and CEAi(cpi, Epi) =
min{λpi, ci}. Since cEpi ≤ cpi, we have λEpi ≥ λpi. Thus,
min{λEpi , cEi } ≥ min{λpi, cEi }.
We know that CEA(cα, Eα) ∈ F (cα, Eα) for all α ∈ P . Hence, CEAi(cα, Eα) = min{λα, ci} ≤
min{Eα, ci} for all i ∈ α ∈ P . Therefore, min
i∈α∈P
min{λα, ci} ≤ min
i∈α∈P
min{Eα, ci} = cEi .
Thus,
min
i∈α∈P
min{λα, ci} = min
i∈α∈P
min{λα, cEi }.
Now
min{λpi, cEi } ≥ min
i∈α∈P
min{λα, cEi } = min
i∈α∈P
min{λα, ci} = min
i∈α∈P
CEAi(cα, Eα).
However, R1 does not satisfy CONS. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, P = {pi1, pi2}, where
pi1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and pi2 = {1, 2}, E = (20, 2), and c = (2, 2, 10, 15). Thus, R1(c, E) =(
1, 1,
76
9
,
86
9
)
. Given M = {3, 4}, PM = {M}, E∗M = (18), and cM = (10, 15),
R1(cM , E∗M ) = (9, 9) 6=
(
76
9
,
86
9
)
.
• Given (c, E) ∈ G(N), consider the following equivalence relation between agents: i ∼ j ⇔
for every pi ∈ P , i ∈ pi ⇔ j ∈ pi. We denote by [k] the equivalence class of agent k ∈ N .
We associate with every [k] a vector xk =
(
xkpi
)
pi∈P ∈ Rp such that:
xkpi =
 0 if [k] ∩ pi = ∅1 if [k] ⊂ pi
Given the problem (N,P, c, E), suppose that the equivalence classes are [1], [2], . . . , [k].
We define (N˜ , P˜ , c˜, E˜) as the problem induced by the equivalence relation ∼. Formally,
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– N˜ = {[1], [2], . . . , [k]}.
– P˜ = {pi1, . . . , pip}, where pi = {[k] ∈ N˜ : [k] ⊂ pi}.
– c˜k =
∑
i∈[k]
ci.
– E˜pi = Epi, for all pi ∈ P .
We define the rule R2 in two stages. In Stage 1 we divide E among the equivalence classes
following the priority rule given by the lexicographic order. Let Pri[j](c˜, E˜) denote the
amount received by the class [j] in Stage 1. In Stage 2 we divide Pri[j](c˜, E˜) among the
members of [j] following the equal award principle. Formally,
Stage 1 For each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, we compute Pri[j](c˜, E˜) where Pri is the priority rule (defined
as before) when the classes are ordered following the lexicographic order applied to
the vectors xj . This means that [i] comes before [j] if and only if xi ≤L xj , where
≤L denotes the lexicographic order.
Stage 2 For any i ∈ [j] we define R2i (c, E) = CEAi(c[j], P ri[j](c˜, E˜)).
It is obvious that R2 satisfies PO.
R2 also satisfies ETE because symmetric agents belong to the same equivalence class and
CEA satisfies ETE.
R2 satisfies LCU because when P = {N}, R2 coincides with CEA and CEA satisfies CU
in bankruptcy problems.
It is easy to see that Pri[j](c˜, E˜) = Pri[j](c˜E , E˜). Since CEA satisfies ICT, it is easy to
conclude that R2 also satisfies ICT.
R2 satisfies CONS. Given M ⊂ N , with M 6= ∅ consider the problem (M,PM , cM , E∗M ).
We must prove that R2i (cM , E
∗
M ) = R
2
i (c, E) for all i ∈M .
Consider the problem (M˜, P˜M , c˜M , E˜∗M ) associated with (M,PM , cM , E
∗
M ):
– M˜ = {[k] ∩M : [k] ∈ N˜ , [k] ∩M 6= ∅}.
– P˜M = {piM : pi ∩M ∈ PM}, where piM = {[k] ∩M ∈ M˜ : [k] ⊂ pi}.
– c˜kM =
∑
j∈[k]∩M
cj .
– E˜∗piM = E
∗
pi∩M .
Assume, without loss of generality, that x1 <L x2 <L . . . <L xk. It is easy to see
that the lexicographic order is preserved among the equivalence classes in M˜ , i.e., given
[i] ∩M, [j] ∩M ∈ M˜ , if [i] <L [j] then [i] ∩M <L [j] ∩M .
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We first prove that Pri[1]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ) =
∑
i∈[1]∩M
R2i (c, E). We assume that [1] ∩M 6= ∅
(otherwise the result is trivial). In order to simplify the notation we assume that |PM | =
|P | .
We know that
Pri[1]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ) = max
 x1 :
(
x1, (yj)j>1
)
∈ F
(
c˜M , E˜
∗
M
)
for some (yj)j>1 with yj ≥ 0 for all j > 1
 .
Let x1 =
∑
i∈[1]∩M
R2i (c, E). Since
(
Pri[j](c˜, E˜)
)k
j=1
∈ F (c˜, E˜), P ri[j](c˜, E˜) ≥ 0 for all
j = 1, ..., k, and Pri[1](c˜, E˜) =
∑
i∈[1]
R2i (c, E) we deduce that
( ∑
i∈[1]∩M
R2i (c, E), (0)j>1
)
∈
F
(
c˜M , E˜
∗
M
)
. Thus, Pri[1]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ) ≥
∑
i∈[1]∩M
R2i (c, E).
Assume that Pri[1]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ) = x1 >
∑
i∈[1]∩M
R2i (c, E). There exists (yj)j>1 with yj ≥ 0
for all j > 1 such that
(
x1, (yj)j>1
)
∈ F
(
c˜M , E˜
∗
M
)
. Let x′1 = x1 +
∑
i∈[1]∩N\M
R2i (c, E).
Therefore,
(
x′1, (yj)j>1
)
∈ F
(
c˜, E˜
)
and hence, Pri[1]
(
c˜, E˜
)
≥ x′1 >
∑
i∈[1]
R2i (c, E) =
Pri[1]
(
c˜, E˜
)
, which is a contradiction.
Taking into account that Pri[1]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ) =
∑
i∈[1]∩M
R2i (c, E), using similar arguments to
those used with Pri[1]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ), we can prove that Pri[2]∩M (c˜M , E˜
∗
M ) =
∑
i∈[2]∩M
R2i (c, E).
Repeating the same reasoning, we can obtain that Pri[j]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M ) =
∑
i∈[j]∩M
R2i (c, E)
for all j ≥ 3.
We now prove that R2i (cM , E
∗
M ) = R
2
i (c, E) for all i ∈M. Assume that i ∈ [j] ∩M.
R2i (cM , E
∗
M ) = CEAi
(
c[j]∩M , P ri[j]∩M (c˜M , E˜∗M )
)
= CEAi
(
c[j]∩M ,
∑
l∈[j]∩M
R2l (c, E)
)
= CEAi
(
c[j]∩M , P ri[j](c, E)−
∑
l∈[j]∩(N\M)
R2l (c, E)
)
= CEAi
(
c[j]∩M , P ri[j](c, E)−
∑
l∈[j]∩(N\M)
CEAl(c[j], P ri[j](c, E))
)
.
Since CEA satisfies CONS, the last expression coincides with CEAi(c[j], P ri[j](c, E)),
which is R2i (c, E).
However, R2 does not satisfy LS. Consider the following example where N = {1, 2, 3},
P = {pi1, pi2} with pi1 = {1, 2} and pi2 = {1, 3}, E = (4, 4), and c = (8, 4, 4). The
lexicographic order is [1], [2] and [3]. Thus, R2(c, E) = (4, 0, 0) and min
2∈pi∈P
{
R22(cpi, Epi)
}
=
R22(cpi1 , Epi1) = CEA2(cpi1 , Epi1) = 2 > 0 = R
2
2(c, E).
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